Applicability of the Agreement: The Agreement applies only to “a person who has served a sentence of imprisonment in a penitentiary or penitentiary establishment” (Articles III (a) and IV (a)) and therefore does not apply to a person awaiting trial. See United States vs. Reed, 620 F.2d 709, 711-12 (9th Cir.), certificate refused, 449 U.p. 880 (1980); United States v. Evans, 423 F. Supp. 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff`d, 556 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1977). Since the agreement only applies to a prisoner based on a pending “indictment, information or complaint” requiring a “procedure” (Articles III (a) and IV (a)), the agreement does not apply to a prisoner based on a probation warrant. See Reed, above.
The procedure for the order of prisoners for a suspended offence is set at 18 U.S.C 4214 (b). The agreement also does not apply to probation criminals. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.p. 716 (1985). The agreement also provides that when a prisoner applies for an order in a case for which a prisoner has been filed, it is a request for a decision on all matters for which prisoners have been filed by the same “[S]tate”. Article III(d) In this context, the different federal districts have been separately designated as `[S]tates`. See United States v. Bryant, 612 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1979), certificate refused, 446 U.p.
920 (1980). Prosecution of other charges that have not been the subject of any prisoner is not permitted by the agreement unless they result from the same transaction. (Article V(d)) ] It is not clear whether the examination of the latter is compulsory. Section IV(a) gives a governor 30 days to reject a request for a transfer by operation or at the request of the prisoner. However, it has been established that a governor of a federal state does not have the right to reject an application in the form of habeas corpus ad prosequendum by a federal court, even if a prisoner has been previously deposed. See United States v. Graham, 622 F.2d 57 (3rd Cir.), cert. Denied, 449 U.S. 904 (1980). See, however, united States vs. Scheer, 729 F.2d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 1984).
The Attorney General has delegated the authority to forward state requests to the Bureau of Prisons as part of the agreement. See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 0.96(s); See also 28 C.F.R. Sec. 527.31 (a). If the U.S. attorney brings the Article IV motion, the indictment on which the motion is based must be completely eliminated before the prisoner returns (including all trials and convictions, according to some courts).
If this is not the case, the accusation shall be rejected by prejudice, unless notification and a possibility of hearing are provided for in accordance with Article 9(2) of the Treaty. (Article IV(e)) In this context, the different federal districts were treated as separate states. See United States v. Woods, 621 F.2d 844 (6th Cir.), cert. Denied, 449 U.p. 877 (1980). Other charges cannot be pursued at the same time, unless they result from the same transaction. (Article V(d)) ] Again, it is not clear whether testing the latter is mandatory or only allowed. Taken in isolation, a habeas corpus ad prosequendum approved by 28 U.S.S.C 2241(c)(5) is not a “prisoner” within the meaning of the law and does not trigger the application of the agreement. However, when a prisoner has been deposed, the use of a letter of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to obtain custody constitutes a “written request” within the meaning of the agreement and activates its provisions. .
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